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Feller: Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Discrimination Claims Under a

COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER A
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT:
THE ODD CASE OF CAESAR WRIGHT *
David E. Feller**

The subject of this article,Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,*** was
decided by Supreme Court on November 16, 1998. This article,predicting the
result and arguingfor the rationaleactually adopted by the Court, was submitted to the Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journalon July 29, 1998.
I. INTRODUCTION
When, if ever, does an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement require an employee claiming that her employer violated
an anti-discrimination statute to arbitrate her statutory claim? The Supreme Court may let us know in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service
Corp.,' which was argued on October 7, 1998.2
Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.3 created the issue. In Gilmer, the Supreme Court held that a broker who had signed a registration
* Author's Note: I wish to express my appreciation to the student editors for their willingness to forego the usual editing and emendation of the text. I accept full responsibility for its errors. The editors have added the commentary, explanation and references in the footnotes. I take
neither credit nor responsibility for them.
** Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California School of Law, Berkeley; President
1992-93, National Academy of Arbitrators; A.B., Harvard College; L.L.B., Harvard Law School.
Professor Feller filed a brief amicus curiae in the Wright case on behalf of the National Academy
of Arbitrators. See Brief of the National Academy of Arbitrators as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1162 (1998) (No. 97-889), available in 1998 WL 221374. The views expressed in this Article, however, do not necessarily represent the position of the Academy.
•*** No. 97-889, 1998 WI 788796 (Nov. 16, 1998).
1. No. 96-2850, 1997 VL 422869, (4th Cir. July 29, 1997), cert. granted,118 S. Ct. 1162
(1998). The Fourth Circuit's decision was referenced in a table of "Decisions Without Published
Opinions" in the Federal Reporter. Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 121 F.3d 702 (4th
Cir. 1997). For the salient facts and issues raised by Wright, see infra notes 90-122 and accompanying text.
2. See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., No. 96-2850, 1997 WL 422869, (4th Cir.
July 29, 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1162 (1998). Certiorari was granted on March 2, 1998.
See id.
3. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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statement with the New York Stock Exchange providing for arbitration
of all disputes with his employer required him to arbitrate his claim that
the employer
had violated the Age Discrimination and Employment Act
4
("ADEA).
Gilmer left a host of undecided questions. One question was
whether the same principle applied to claims of violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 5 as amended in 1991.6 All of
the circuits, except the Ninth,7 that have addressed this question have

now agreed that it does.' A second question was whether the same rule
applied where the arbitration agreement was contained in a collective
bargaining agreement.9 All of the circuits, except the Fourth,'0 have held
4. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23; 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994). The employee alleged that his
employer discriminated against him in contravention of the ADEA. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23-24.
The Supreme Court ordered the employee to exhaust the grievance process contained in the employment agreement, and thus required him to arbitrate the claim rather than litigate it in a judicial
forum. See id at 35. The principle supporting this conclusion was that a claim of violation of the
ADEA can be arbitrable. See id. at 26-35. The Court acknowledged that the ADEA was designed
to further "important social policies," but enforcing agreements to arbitrate age discrimination
claims that are contained in individual employment contracts would not impede furtherance of
these policies. See id, at 27.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994). For more on employer requirements under Title
VII, see infra note 218.
6. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 118, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994)) (encouraging the use of alternative dispute
resolution to resolve Title VII and other statutory discrimination claims). Some feel that the text,
legislative history, and underlying purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 actually disfavors the
use of arbitration as a mechanism to handle claims arising under Title VII. See Miriam A. Cherry,
Note, Not-So-ArbitraryArbitration: Using Title VII DisparateImpact Analysis to Invalidate Employment ContractsThat Discriminate,21 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 267, 286-91 (1998).
7. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 1998),
petitionfor cert.filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3113 (U.S. Aug. 18, 1998) (No. 98-237).
8. See, e.g., Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1487 (10th
Cir. 1994) (holding that Title VI claims were subject to mandatory arbitration); Mago v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 934-35 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that employee failed to establish that Congress, in passing Title VII, intended to preclude arbitration of Title VII claims, and
requiring employee to arbitrate pursuant to employment application clause); Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 229-30 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that Title VII claims can be subjected to compulsory arbitration); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 307, 310-12
(6th Cir. 1991) (subjecting sex discrimination claims to arbitration).
9. Some commentators opine that those with claims under an anti-discrimination statute
should be required to exhaust any available arbitration mechanisms under a collective bargaining
agreement. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the
(Alternative) Forum: Reexamining Alexander v. Gardner-Denver in the Wake of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1997 BYU L. REv. 591, 628-29 (1997) (asserting that an agreement to
arbitrate that is negotiated by a union is "unquestionably voluntary and the result of exactly the
kind of vigorous, two-sided negotiation that eliminates questions of compulsion"); Carla Wong
McMillian, Comment, Collective BargainingAgreements, Mandatory Arbitration, and Title VII:
Varner v. National Super Markets, Inc., 32 GA. L. REv. 287, 306-13 (1997) (critiquing a decision
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that it does not." The Supreme Court has now decided to address that
issue."
It is usually not wise to predict the outcome of a pending Supreme
Court case.'3 I will, however, predict the result in Wright. The Fourth
Circuit will be reversed. "' The only real question, in my view, is the rationale that it will offer for that result. On that, my crystal ball is cloudy.
There are at least two possible methods of reaching the result I have just
predicted, and it may be that the Court will utilize both, or more likely,
divide on the rationale. My purpose in this Article is to separate out the
arguments and to urge strongly for one of them.
II. THE BACKGROUND

The story begins in 1974, long before not only Gilmer,but also before what has been called the second arbitration trilogy' 5 - Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 6 Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon17 and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearthat allowed an employee covered by a collective agreement to avoid arbitration).
10. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 885 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996).
11. Thus, in every circuit except the Fourth, an employee represented by a union is not necessarily required to submit her discrimination-based grievance to arbitration. Rather, she may be
allowed to pursue a court action instead. See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
12. Charles A. Edwards, who represents the Respondents in Wright, frames the
"fundamental issue" as "whether labor-management arbitration can satisfy the policies underlying
federal employment discrimination legislation, or whether the possibility of a union's unfair or
negligent representation suffices to force all such disputes into the courts." Charles A. Edwards,
ArbitratingDiscriminationCases Under Union Contracts,NAT'LL.J., May 4, 1998, at A21.
13. Cf. Charles Fried, Impudence, SUP. CT. RE v. 155, 187 (1992) (revealing that he does
"not believe that a conscientious judge fulfills her role in a hierarchy of courts by seeking to predict how a superior court will rule").
14. For a contrary view, see Roberto L. Corrado, The Arbitral Imperative in Labor and Employment Law, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 919, 935.
15. See John-Paul Motley, Note, Compulsory ArbitrationAgreements in Employment ContractsFrom Gardner-Denver to Austin: The Legal Uncertaintyand Why Employers Should Choose
Not to Use Preemployment ArbitrationAgreements, 51 VAND. L. REV. 687, 695 (1998) (referring
to the "Mitsubishitrilogy of arbitration cases addressing statutory claims").
16. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). In Mitsubishi,an automobile manufacturer sued to compel arbitration of a dispute under the authority of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994), based
on a clause in a distributorship agreement providing that all disputes arising under the agreement
would be arbitrated in Japan. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 618-19. The Supreme Court held that the
alleged claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-36 (1994), were indeed arbitrable
pursuant to the Arbitration Act. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628-29.
17. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). In McMahon, a brokerage firm was sued by one of its customers,
who alleged fraud. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 223. The firm moved to compel arbitration pursuant
to an agreement between the parties. See id. The Supreme Court extended its Mitsubishi presump-
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5 Before that trilogy, the accepted
son/American Express, Inc."
doctrine
had been expressed in Wilko v. Swan, 9 which held that an agreement to
arbitrate would not bar suit to enforce a non-waiveable statutory right
for which Congress had provided a judicial remedy.' The forum made a
difference, and a private agreement to arbitrate could not be enforced to
deprive a plaintiff of his right to directly use the judicial forum.2 ' That
principle went out the window in the Mitsubishi trilogy.2 But while that
principle was still in existence, the Supreme Court decided Alexander v.
Gardner-DenverCo.2
Alexander has been cited repeatedly for the proposition that an
employee cannot be required to utilize the arbitration procedure under a
collective bargaining agreement rather than bringing suit for claimed
violation of an anti-discrimination statute.7 That was not the issue in
Alexander. The issue was whether an employee who had actually arbi-

trated and lost a claim of violation of a no-discrimination provision in a
collective agreement was thereafter barred from bringing suit under Title VII.2Y Given Wilko, it would have been clearly untenable to argue
that the plaintiff was required to arbitrate under the collective bargain-

tion of arbitrability of statutory claims to claims arising under § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994), and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994). See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238, 242. Thus, the arbitration agreement was enforced. See id. at 242.
18. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). In Rodriguez de Qui/as,a broker tried to enforce an agreement to
arbitrate under a customer agreement. See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 478-79. The Supreme
Court held that the arbitration agreement precluded litigation of claims arising under the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994), as well as claims arising under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994). See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490
U.S. at 482-83.
19. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). In Wilko, a securities buyer claimed that the seller had procured the
transaction through fraud and brought suit under § 12(2) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994). See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428-29. The sales contract contained an
arbitration clause, and the seller moved for a stay of the suit pending arbitration. See id. at 429.
20. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438. The Court noted that the purpose of the 1933 Act was to
protect investors, and that investors would be best protected if they were not bound to the Federal
Arbitration Act in the arena of securities sales. See id. at 431, 438.
21. Thus, the Court refused to order the buyer to attempt to exhaust the grievance machinery. See id. at 438.
22. In fact, Wilko was expressly overruled in Rodriguez de QuUas. See Rodriguez de Quijas,
490 U.S. at 485.
23. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
24. See Gilmer,500 U.S. at 33; Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 411
(1988); Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900, 903 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), denying
cert. to Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982).
25. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 49.
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ing agreement.2 The argument was the reverse. The plaintiff, it was argued, had two potential remedies: a lawsuit or arbitration. 2 Having
elected arbitration, he should therefore be bound by the result.2 And so
the District Court held: "We cannot accept a philosophy which gives the
' 2
employee two strings to his bow when the employer only has one.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed per curiam.30 The Supreme Court reversed."
The plaintiff, the Court held, had indeed two strings. As the Court
put it:
[A] contractual right to submit a claim to arbitration is not displaced
simply because Congress also has provided a statutory right against
discrimination. Both rights have legally independent origins ....Thus
the arbitrator has authority to resolve only questions of contractual
rights, and this authority remains regardless of whether certain contractual rights are similar to, or duplicative of, the substantive rights secured by Title VII.32
In short, Alexander was not entitled to two bites of the apple.
Rather, he had two apples and was entitled to one bite of each. The
Court then went on to reject any deferral to the arbitrator's decision.3
The Court asserted that "arbitral processes" were
comparatively inferior to judicial processes in the protection of Title
VII rights ....
Parties usually choose an arbitrator because they trust
his knowledge and judgment concerning the demands and norms of
industrial relations. On the other hand, the resolution of statutory or
constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of courts, and judicial
construction has proved especially necessary with respect to Title VII,
whose broad language frequently can begiven meaning only by reference to public law concepts.3

26. See Robert N. Covington, Employment Arbitration After Gilmer: Have Labor Courts
Come to the United States?, 15 HoFsTRA LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L.J. 345, 366-67 (1998)
(observing the Supreme Court's "hostility to arbitration of statutory issues" evinced in the Wilko
opinion).
27. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 49.
28. See id.
29. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (D. Colo. 1971).
30. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 43.
31. See id. at 60.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 56.
34. Id. at 57.
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At the very end of the opinion, in a footnote, the Court added what
I shall call Alexander's "furthermore": the union's exclusive control
over arbitration."
A further concern is the union's exclusive control over the manner and
extent to which an individual grievance is presented. In arbitration, as
in the collective-bargaining process, the interests of the individual
employee may be subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit. Moreover, harmony of interest between
the union and the individual employee cannot always be presumed, especially where a claim of racial discrimination is made.
Later, as we shall see, the "furthermore" has overwhelmed the
opinion.
The basic principle enunciated was applied in different contexts in
two subsequent cases: Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,
Inc.37 and McDonald v. City of West Branch." In both, a grievance had
been filed under a collective bargaining agreement and lost in arbitration,39 and the lower courts held that this barred a subsequent suit
claiming a statutory violation. 4 In both, the Supreme Court reversed on
Alexander grounds. In McDonald, the Court summarized the rule of
the three cases thusly: "Congress intended the statutes at issue in those
cases to be judicially enforceable and that arbitration could not provide
an adequate substitute for judicial proceedings in adjudicating claims
under those statutes.' 42 The Court offered three considerations to support that conclusion. First, the comparative lack of arbitrable expertise, 3
second, the lack of arbitral authority to adjudicate statutory, as con-

35. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19.
36. Id (citations omitted).
37. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
38. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
39. In McDonald, a discharged police officer, after an arbitrator found proper cause for his
termination, filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), asserting that the firing
came about as a result of his exercise of First Amendment rights. See McDonald,466 U.S. at 28586. In Barrentine, a group of truckdrivers filed a grievance pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement, alleging that their employer failed to compensate them for time worked as required
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994). See Barrentine,450 U.S. at
731-32. The joint arbitration committee ruled for the employer without explanation, and the truckdrivers brought suit based on their statutory claim. See id. at 731.
40. See Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 734; McDonald, 466 U.S. at 287.
41. See Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 737-46; McDonald, 466 U.S. at 288-93.
42. McDonald,466 U.S. at 289.
43. See id. at 290.
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trasted with contractual, issues, 4 and third, the union's control of the
grievance procedure, citing footnote nineteen in Alexander.5
Then the legal landscape changed. In the Mitsubishi trilogy, the
Court held that an agreement to arbitrate would be enforced pursuant to
the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 46 to preclude direct suit for claims
of violation of the antitrust laws,47 the Securities and Exchange Acts of
193341 and 1934, 49 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")." Wilko was overruled.5"

Finally, in Gilmer, this new rule was applied to claims of violation
of the ADEA.52 Although Gilmer involved an individual employee's
agreement," it was argued on his behalf that Alexander and its progeny

precluded requiring arbitration of employment discrimination claims.-A
The argument was rejected. 55 The Court reiterated the three bases for the
Alexander rule and distinguished Gilmer from them5 6 (1) because enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate was a different question than
preclusion of a subsequent statutory claim where the employees had not
agreed to arbitrate the statutory claims and the labor arbitrators were not
authorized to resolved such claims,57 (2) because the claimants were represented by their unions in arbitration and there was a potential tension
between collective representation and individual rights," and (3) be-

44. See id.
45. See id. at 291 (citing Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19).
46. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994); see Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477, 479-84 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-27 (1987);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625-26 (1985).
47. See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-36 (1994); see Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at
628-29.
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994); see Rodriguez de Quijas,490 U.S. at 480-83.
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-781l (1994); see McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238.
50. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994); gee McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242.
51. See Rodriguez de Quijas,490 U.S. at 484-85. For more discussion on the second arbitration trilogy and the overruling of Wilko, see Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective
Bargainingand Individual Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a ProposedSolution, 77
B.U. L. REV. 687, 727-29 (1997).
52. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). For more on employer requirements under the ADEA, see infra note 216.
53. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
54. See id. at 33.
55. See id. at 33-35.
56. See id. at 35.
57. See id.
58. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
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cause those case were not decided under the FAA,59 which favors arbitration. °
The third distinction was without a difference. Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 61 which governs labor
arbitration, is as favorable to arbitration as is the FAA.62 The first distinction would disappear if the collective bargaining agreement in fact
authorized the arbitrator under a collective bargaining agreement to resolve statutory claims. In that event, only the second distinction, the
footnote "furthermore" in Alexander,6 would appear to distinguish it
from Gilmer, and the question would be whether it was sufficient.
That question at least appeared to present itself in Austin v. OwensBrockway Glass Container,Inc.4 Suppose that a collective bargaining
agreement did not simply contain an,anti-discrimination provision, theo59. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
60. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25; see also Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625-26 (observing that
"Congress in passing the Act 'requires that [the courts] rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate."'); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (noting the
"congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements"); Acquaire
v. Canada Dry Bottling, 906 F. Supp. 819, 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that "[flederal policy
strongly favors arbitration ....).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1994).
62. The Supreme Court has held that section 301 of the LMRA requires courts to enforce
collective bargaining agreements' arbitration provisions unless "the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute." United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960). Judicial review of arbitration awards is
also severely limited. See United Steelworkers of Am.v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 599 (1960) (announcing that "so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of
the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract
is different than his."). Finally, employees must attempt to exhaust any existing grievance arbitration procedures embodied in a collective bargaining agreement before they may bring suit in court
to enforce contractual rights. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965)
(asserting that "there can be no doubt that the employee must afford the union the opportunity to
act on his behalf' in this situation). For additional background regarding labor arbitration under
section 301 of the LMRA, see G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other FederalEmployment Statutes:
When is CommercialArbitration an "Adequate Substitute" for the Courts?, 68 TEX.L. REV. 509,
517-26 (1990).
63. Alexander v. Gardener-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974).
64. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 432 (1996). In Austin, the collective bargaining agreement did not simply contain an anti-discrimination provision, theoretically separate
from the statutory provision, but actually incorporated various anti-discrimination statutes as terms
of the collective bargaining agreement. See Austin, 78 F.3d at 879. Specifically, the provisions
stated that "[tihe Company... will comply with all laws preventing discrimination against any
employee because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or veteran status" as
well as "the applicable provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act." Id. The female employee asserted that her employer violated Title VII, see infra note 218, as well as the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994), see infra note 216. See Austin, 78 F.3d at
877.
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retically separate from the statutory prohibition, but actually incorporated the statute as a term of the collective bargaining agreement. In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,' the Supreme Court had decided that a

claim of violation of a collective bargaining agreement containing a
grievance arbitration provision could not be sued upon, but must be
arbitrated. 66 If the agreement incorporated the statute as one of its terms,
didn't the Maddox rule apply? The Fourth Circuit said that it did, and
therefore dismissed Austin's statutory claim.67 Although the opinion
contained language that seemed to suggest that the Court believed that
Gilmer had overruled Alexander,6 the decision essentially relied on
Maddox and the supposed incorporation of Title VII and the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 69 into the collective bargaining agreement. 0 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.7'
75
74
73
72
There followed cases in the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, 76 Tenth 77 and Eleventh76 Circuits in which arbitration provisions
65. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
66. See Maddox, 379 U.S. at 652-53.
67. See Austin, 78 F.3d at 885-86.
68. The Fourth Circuit stated:
To [hold for the employee], we would have to hold that Gilmer has no effect at all and
that Alexander is still the law that statutory claims cannot be the subject of required
arbitration. We do not think that Congress intended [by enacting section 118 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991] to return to the old law.
Id. at 882. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII and provided that "[w]here appropriate
and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including ... arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under [Title VII] ....
Civil Rights
Act of 1991, § 118, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994)). The Americans with Disabilities Act contains identical language. See
42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1994).
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
70. See Austin, 78 F.3d at 885-86. That the incorporation theory was the basis for Austin was
made clear by the Fourth Circuit in Brown v. Trans World Airlines, 127 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1997).
In Brown, the collective bargaining agreement contained an anti-discrimination provision virtually
identical to that in Alexander, but one which differed from that involved in Austin because the
agreement did not refer in any way to the law. See Brown, 127 F.3d at 341-42. The Fourth Circuit
held that the provision did not authorize arbitration of statutory claims and therefore was not a bar
to the Title VII suit. See id. at 342.
71. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996).
72. See Martin v. Dana Corp., 75 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 871 (3d Cir. 1997). The decision has been marked by the court as "Not for Publication." The circuit's first decision was
originally reported in the advance sheets at 114 F.3d 421 and unofficially at 73 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1803, but was unpublished when the court granted rehearing en bane at 114 F.3d 428.
The court then vacated the en bane rehearing at 124 F.3d 590. However, the court did not reinstate
the original opinion and instead issued a new one marked as "Not for Publication."
73. See Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 1997).
74. See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 295
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in collective agreements were argued to require arbitration of claims involving violation of anti-discrimination statutes. 79 In each case the ar-

gument was unsuccessful.

°

Among the earliest, and in my view the most significant of these
cases, was the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Pryner v. Tractor
Supply Co."' Pryner was really two cases. In one, the plaintiff was Sobierajski. In the case, the agreement provided that "in accordance with

applicable Federal and State law, neither the company nor the Union
will discriminate against employees covered by this collective bargaining agreement in regard to any terms or conditions of employment on
the basis of race, creed, religion, national origin, sex or age."82 In the

other, Pryner, the no-discrimination provision in the collective agreement made no reference at all to the law. 3 The Seventh Circuit, in an
opinion by Judge Posner, treated the two provisions identically. 4 The
issue, as the court saw it, was whether Alexander or Gilmer controlled. 5
Focusing directly on the possible tension between the claimant and the
union, the court concluded that "on balance" the case was "closer to Alexander," and so arbitration was not required. 6 Austin, the court acknowledged, was in conflict." The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 8

(1997).
75. See Vamer v. National Super Mkts., Inc., 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 946 (1997).
76. See Doyle v. Raley's Inc., No. 97-15863, 1998 WL 697395 (9th Cir. Sept. 22, 1998).
77. See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. granted and
remanded on othergrounds, 118 S.Ct. 2364 (1998).
78. See Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (1lth Cir. 1997).
79. See Martin, 75 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 871 (involving claim of violation of Title
VII); Penny, 128 F.3d at 409 (involving claim of violation of the ADA); Pryner, 109 F.3d at 355
(involving claims of violation of various federal anti-discrimination statutes); Doyle, 1998 WL
697395, at *1 (involving claims of violation of various federal anti-discrimination statutes); Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1439 (involving claim of violation of Title VI); Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 521
(involving claim of violation of the ADA); Varner, 94 F.3d at 1211 (involving claim of violation
of Title VII).
80. See Martin, 75 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 873; Penny, 128 F.3d at 414; Pryner,109
F.3d at 365; Doyle, 1998 WL 697395, at *2;Harrison,112 F.3d at 1454; Brisentine, 117 F.3d at
526-27; Varner,94 F.3d at 1212.
81. 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir.), cert.denied, 118 S. Ct. 295 (1997).
82. Pryner,109 F.3d at 356.
83, See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 363-64.
86. Id. at 365.
87. See Pryner, 109 F.3d at 365.
88. See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 295
(1997).
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The cases in the other circuits decided similarly, treating the issue
as presenting the question of whether Gilmer overruled Alexander's
"furthermore" and concluding, contrary to Austin, that the
"furthermore" controlled. 9

III. WRIGHT'S CASE

A. The Wright Facts
Then Wright v. Universal Maritime Service, Corp.9° came along.
Ceasar Wright was a longshoreman. 9' His employment was governed by
a collective bargaining agreement between the South Carolina Stevedores Association and Local 1422 of the International Longshoreman's
Association.' Wright suffered a work-related injury and filed a worker's
compensation claim under the Longshoreman and Harbor Worker's
Compensation Act,93 claiming permanent and total disability.94 The
claim was settled.95 Wright then recovered and received a medical clearance to return to work.96 He was dispatched from the Union hiring hall,
and for a few days, he was hired by several of the stevedoring companies.9' The companies then discovered that Wright had accepted the
worker's compensation settlement and refused to accept him when he
was sent out of the hiring hall, stating in identical letters to the local
union president that "once an individual is certified as permanently and
totally disabled, he is no longer qualified to perform longshore work of
any kind."'" The local union president protested to the companies."
89. See, e.g., Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 526 (refusing to subject employee to compulsory arbitration on ADA claim); Martin, 75 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 873 (refusing to subject employee's Title VII claim to arbitration); Penny, 128 F.3d at 412-14 (refusing to force employee's
ADA claim to go to arbitration); Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1452-54 (refusing to subject employee's
Title VII claim to arbitration); Varner, 94 F.3d at 1213 (refusing to force employee to exhaust
grievance procedure for her Title VII claim).
90. No. 96-2850, 1997 WL 422869 (4th Cir. July 29, 1997), cert. granted, 118 S.Ct. 1162

(1998).
91.

See Wright, 1997 WL422869, at **1.

92. See id.
93. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1994).
94. See Wright, 1997 WL 422869, at **I.
95. The claim was settled for $250,000. See id.

96. See id.
97. See id.
98. Brief for Petitioner, Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1162 (1998)
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When this proved fruitless, he then advised Wright to retain counsel and
pursue his rights under the ADA.' ° Wright did so. He filed a charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and, after receiving a right to sue letter, filed suit against the stevedoring companies in
January 1996. 0'
The Fourth Circuit decided Austin in March 1996."° The stevedoring companies in Wright's case then filed a motion for summary judgment relying on Austin.'°3 Unlike Austin, the collective bargaining
agreement in Wright's case did not contain any anti-discrimination
provision,) 4 let alone one that arguably incorporated the ADA as a term
of the agreement so as to bring into play the Maddox principle.' 0' The
agreement in Wright did, however, differ from Austin in another respect.
It did not expressly limit its arbitration provision to disputes as to the
proper interpretation or application of the terms of the agreement.' 6 It
simply provided that "[m]atters under dispute which cannot be promptly
settled between the Local and an individual Employer shall, no later
than 48 hours after such discussion, be referred in writing covering the
entire grievance to a Port Grievance Committee" consisting of an equal
member of union and employer members.' Then the agreement provided that "[iun the event the Committee is unable to reach a majority
decision within 72 hours after meeting to discuss the case," an arbitrator
should be appointed.' The agreement did contain a standard savings
clause'" providing that "no provision or part of this Agreement shall be
violative of any Federal or State Law.""0 The district court relied on that
(No. 97-889), available in 1998 WL 232769, at *2 [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].

99. See Wright, 1997 WL 422869, at **I.
100. See id. For more on employer obligations under the ADA, see infra note 216.
101. See Wright, 1997 WL 422869, at **1.
102. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
103. See Wright, 1997 WL 422869, at **1.
104. See id. at **2.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
106. See Wright, 1997 WL 422869, at **2.
107. Petitioner's Brief, supranote 98, at *6-*7.
108. Id. at *7.
109. Recognition appears in numerous collective bargaining agreements that a law or court
decision could potentially nullify a particular portion of the agreement. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, INC., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING CoNTRAcrs 251 (1941). A "savings clause" is a separability clause often inserted into a collective bargaining agreement stipulating that if any portion
of the agreement is subsequently found to be invalid, the remaining provisions are to remain in full
force and effect. See id. To the same end, provisions of state and federal labor laws are written into
some agreements by specifying that the agreement is to be subject to any applicable laws, or that
no party is to be required by the agreement to take any illegal action. See id.
110. Petitioner's Brief, supranote 98, at *6.
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and the presumption of arbitrability expressed in such cases as Moses H.
1
Cone Memorial Hospitalv. Mercury Construction Co.,' 1as well as, under a collective bargaining agreement, United Steelworkers of America
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co."' The district court concluded that
the arbitration provision was easily "susceptible of an interpretation"
disability discrimination claim, and so his suit
that it covered Wright's
113
should be dismissed.
14
Wright appealed, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. In an unpublished opinion, it said that "under Austin the only issue in this case is
whether there was an agreement to arbitrate ADA claims" in the collective bargaining agreement." 5 There was such an agreement, the Court
concluded, because the arbitration clause was "particularly broad," in
that the agreement said that it was "intended to cover all matters affect'1 6
of employment."
ing wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
7
(This language was not in fact contained in the arbitration provision. It
was part of an entirely separate standard "zipper" clause whereby the
union waived its right to bargain about matters not covered by the
agreement during its term of operation."1 ) Claims of violation of the
ADA, the court concluded, were therefore covered even though the
9
agreement did not specifically address such claims."
1 20
A petition for certiorari was filed. The question presented in the
petition was whether the court below was "correct in holding - contrary to [the] Court's decisions in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
and other cases, and contrary to seven other circuits - that a general
arbitration clause in a collective bargaining contract bars an employee
111. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). In Moses H. Cone, a contractor sought arbitration of a dispute that
arose with the employer. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 7. The Supreme Court decided that the
issue should be arbitrated, citing the FAA, which encourages ushering of disputing parties out of
court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible. See id. at 22. Furthermore, the Court
restated its healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration. See id. at 23.
112. 363 U.S. 574 (1960). In Warrior & Gulf, the Supreme Court held that employees, who
were distraught over their employer's action in contracting out work, would be forced to exhaust
the grievance process. See Warrior& Gulf, 363 U.S. at 575, 585.
113. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 98, at *9.
114. See Wright, 1997 WL 422869, at **1-**2.
115. Id. at **2.
116. Id.
117. See Petitioner's Brief, supranote 98, at *9.
118. See id. For more discussion on "zipper" clauses, see 4 THEODORE KHEEL, LABOR LAW, §
16A.02[2] (1996).
119. See Wright, 1997 WL 422869, at **2.
120. The petition for certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court. See Wright v. Universal
Maritime Serv. Corp., No. 96-2850, 1997 WL 422869 (4th Cir. July 29, 1997), cert. granted, 118
S. Ct. 1162 (1998).
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covered by the contract from filing his own lawsuit under a federal anti-

discrimination statute ....

,,,12

The Supreme Court granted the petition."

One can only guess as to why the Supreme Court granted review. It
clearly was not to correct a misstatement of the law in the Fourth Cir-

cuit's opinion that might lead other courts astray. There was no law in

the opinion and it was unpublished. Furthermore, it is standard doctrine
that the Court does not grant review of a case simply because it was
wrongly decided.' 3 It appears that the Court, or at least four members,
wants to say something in this area. And so it appeared to others once
certiorari was granted. Amicus briefs were filed in support of Wright by
the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis6
sion," 2 the American Civil Liberties Union," z and the AFL-CIO,1
among others. The United States Chamber of Commerce, 27 the National
Association of Manufacturers," the Equal Employment Advisory
Council and the Labor Policy Association,'29 and others filed briefs supporting the companies.
B. The Wright Question
The ground claimed for certiorari in Wright v. UniversalMaritime
Service Corp.3" did not in fact exist. There is no conflict between the
121. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 98, at *i.
122. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
123. "A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists
of... the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law." SUP. Cr. REV. 10 (1997).
124. See Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1162
(1998) (No. 97-889), available in 1998 WL 232820.
125. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of South
Carolina, in Support of Petitioner, Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1162
(1998) (No. 97-889), available in 1998 WL 241634.
126. See Brief of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
and the International Longshoremen's Association, and its Local 1422 as Amici Curiae in Support
of the Petitioner, Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1162 (1998) (No. 97-889),
availablein 1998 WL 232714.
127. See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1162 (1998) (No. 97-889),
availablein 1998 WL 346623.
128. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Association of Manufacturers in Support of
Respondents, Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1162 (1998) (No. 97-889),
available in 1998 WL 351057.
129. See Brief Amici Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council, the Labor Policy
Association, and the Employers Group in Support of Respondents, Wright v. Universal Maritime
Serv. Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1162 (1998) (No. 97-889), available in 1998 WL 351061.
130. No. 96-2850, 1997 WL 422869 (4th Cir. July 29, 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1162
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Fourth Circuit's decision and Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.'s13 basic "two apple" holding, nor is there any conflict between the circuits on
that question. Alexander and its two progeny, Barrentine v. ArkansasBest Freight System, Inc.3 2 and McDonald v. City of West Branch, 33 all
involved a single issue: whether an adverse arbitral adjudication as to

the meaning of a collective bargaining term comparable to a statutory
protection barred a subsequent suit on the statutory claim.' 4 In Alexander, the substantive collective bargaining provision was a nodiscrimination clause in the collective bargaining agreement; the statu-

tory provision was Title VII's prohibition against discrimination.' 35 In
Barrentine, the agreement provision was for the payment of overtime
for hours worked beyond forty in the week; the statutory provision was
the Fair Labor Standards Act's ("FLSA")' 36 similar requirement.'" In
McDonald,the collective bargaining provision prohibited discharge except for just cause;131 the statutory provision prohibited against infringement by police of First Amendment rights. 39 In all three cases, the
Supreme Court held that an adverse adjudication of the collective bargaining agreement restriction on employer conduct, even though similar
or parallel to a statutory restriction, would not bar a subsequent suit on a
separate claim of violation of the statute."4
(1998). For citations to the other relevant Wright citations, see supranote1.
131. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
132. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
133. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
134. See McDonald,466 U.S. at 285; Barrentine,450 U.S. at 729-30; Alexander, 415 U.S. at
43.
135. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 39. Specifically, the agreement stated "that 'there shall be no
discrimination against any employee on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or
ancestry."' Id. Title VII similarly bars employment discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
136. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
137. Barrentine,450 U.S. at 730-31. The FLSA's similar requirement was that "[e]very employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any work-week is engaged in commerce ... wages ....
29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1994).
138. See McDonald,466 U.S. at 286 n.2.
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The statute in pertinent part provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
Id. The discharged police officer alleged that he was fired "for exercising his First Amendment
rights of freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom to petition the government for
redress of grievances." McDonald,466 U.S. at 286.
140. See McDonald,466 U.S. at 292; Barrentine,450 U.S. at 745; Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-
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Wright's case was different. There was absolutely nothing in the
collective bargaining agreement which could be said, even arguably, to
parallel or duplicate the provisions of the ADA. Nor is there any intercircuit conflict as to the continual vitality of the basic Alexander holding
as to the effect to be given to the presence of an anti-discrimination
provision in a collective bargaining agreement on the right of an em-

ployee to bring suit for violation of a comparable statutory prohibition. 4' On that issue, all the circuits, including the Fourth, are in agreement. This is graphically illustrated by the Fourth Circuit's decision,
subsequent to Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.,'42 in
Brown v. Trans World Airlines.' The agreement in Brown contained a

no-discrimination provision that did not contain any reference to the
law."' The court therefore concluded that because there was no incorporation of the statute in the agreement, Alexander rather than Austin governed, and arbitration of the statutory claim was not required.'45
There is indeed an inter-circuit conflict. The conflict is not with Alexander's "two apple" holding, but as to the effect of its "furthermore"
footnote.' 4 The question is whether potential conflict between union and
claimant prevents enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate statutory
claims that would be enforceable except for that factor.'47 On that ques-

tion, the Fourth Circuit, in both Austin and Wright, is in disagreement
with the other circuits.

60.
141. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60.
142. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
143. 127 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1997).
144. See Brown, 127 F.3d at 342. The no-discrimination provision in the collective bargaining agreement specifically provided that the employer would not "discriminate against any employee... on account of race; color, creed, religion, sex (sexual harassment), age, handicap, national origin, or veteran status .... This paragraph reaffinms the long standing mutual practice of
[the employer]." Id. at 338.
145. See id. at 341.
146. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at58 n.19.
147. Alternatively stated, the question is if the possibility that the union "might be inclined to
sacrifice" the individual's rights in this situation should excuse the arbitration requirement. See
Marshall W. Grate, Binding Arbitration of Statutory Employment DiscriminationClaims, 70 U.
DET. MERCy L. REv. 699, 712 (1993). Why might a union do this? Perhaps "because of a possible
conflict of interest. The claim may raise the specter of [the union's] possible tolerance of discriminatory practices in order to maintain peace with the employer, or [to avoid] the union's own potential liability." H. David Kelly, Jr., An Argumentfor Retaining the Well EstablishedDistinction
Between Contractualand Statutory Claimsin LaborArbitration,75 U. DEr. MERcY L. REV. 1, 68
(1997).
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C. The Wright Answer
The issue on which the circuits disagree needs to be resolved only
if one assumes that, except for the "furthermore" issue, the collective
bargaining agreement would be a bar to the direct suit by an employee
claiming a violation of an anti-discrimination statute. That, in turn, requires the assumption that the collective agreement makes the statutory
claim arbitrable. That is the critical question in Wright v. Universal
Maritime Service Corp.' The answer to that question, in my view, not
only resolves Wright, but also resolves Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass
Container,Inc., 49 Prynerv. TractorSupply Co.'50 and all of the cases in
the other circuits that disagree with Austin.
The rules governing substantive arbitrability under section 301 of
the LMRA are well established.' First, unless the parties explicitly
provide otherwise, substantive arbitrability is a question for a court, not
the arbitrator.'52 Second, as the Supreme Court held in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior& Gulf Navigation Co.,153 "[a]n order to
arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be
said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible
of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be
resolved in favor of coverage.''54
These principles, if applicable, would appear to support the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Wright. The first principle - that arbitrability
must be determined by the court - is clearly applicable. The real issue
in Wright is whether the second principle - the presumption of arbi-

148. No. 96-2850, 1997 WL 422869 (4th Cir. July 29, 1997), cert. granted, 118 S.Ct. 1162
(1998). For the other relevant citations to the Wright case, see supra note 1.
149. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
150. 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997).
151. See generally James W. Hambright & Robert J. Hambright, Survey, Labor and Employment Law, 19 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 731,744-58 (1988) (providing an overview of these rules).
152. See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).
"[T]he question of arbitrability - whether a collective-bargaining agreement creates a duty for the
parties to arbitrate the particular grievance - is undeniably an issue for judicial determination."
Id. Thus, the Seventh Circuit erred when it ordered the employer and union to "arbitrate the arbitrability question," specifically the question of if a grievance regarding the employer's layoff
practices was arbitrable. See id. at 651-52.
153. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
154. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-83. In Warrior& Gulf, grievances regarding management function could not be arbitrated according to the collective bargaining agreement. See id. at
576. However, an issue arose if the decision to contract out work was a management function. See
id. at 583-84. The Court felt that the presumption of arbitrability required the issue to be decided
by the arbitrator rather than a court. See id. at 585.
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trability - also applies. It is my thesis that it should not and that the
Fourth Circuit should'be reversed on that ground rather than on Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.'s"' "furthermore" caution about the potential tension between the union and claimants.' 56
The presumption of arbitrability under section 301 of the LMRA is
explicitly based upon considerations which are simply inapplicable
where the question is whether an arbitration provision encompasses
claims not based on the contract but on a statute not incorporated in the
contract. In Warrior & Gulf, the Supreme Court, in announcing the presumption, said in justification that "[t]he labor arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to the courts; the considerations which help
him fashion judgments may indeed be foreign to the competence of
courts."'' 7 As the Court repeated in AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America,'58 the "presumption of arbitrability for
labor disputes recognizes the greater institutional competence of arbitrators in interpreting collective-bargaining agreements ... ,,59 That presumption is simply inapplicable where the question is not the interpretation of the substantive provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement, but rather the interpretation and application of a statute.
Applying statutory law, not the collective agreement or the common law
of the shop, is not the normal practice of labor arbitrators; further, they
are not normally chosen for their expertise in the law.IW Indeed, many
6
labor arbitrators are not lawyers.' '
More fundamentally, invocation of the presumption of arbitrability,
when it is urged as a bar to an employee suit based on a statute, has far

155. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
156. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at58 n.19.
157. Warrior& Gulf, 363 U.S. at 581.
158. 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
159. AT&T, 475 U.S. at 650.
160. "Arbitrators are not to determine whether a grievant's statutory rights have been violated." Charles J. Coleman & Gerald C. Coleman, Toward a New Paradigmof Labor Arbitration

in the Federal Courts, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. LJ. 1, 64-65 (1995). For more on the "common law of
the shop," see infra note 220.
161. "[S]ome of the most renowned arbitrators, with the sharpest legal minds, are not members of the bar." Shalu Tandon Buckley, Note, PracticalConcerns Regarding the Arbitration of
Statutory Employment Claims: Questions That Remain Unanswered After Gilmer and Some Suggested Answers, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 149, 174 (1996) (citing to Arnold Zack, President
of the National Academy of Arbitrators). An arbitrator, who is "usually well-qualified," typically
has "advanced academic degrees-normally a J.D. or Ph.D., is over fifty years of age, has more
than twenty years of experience in labor arbitration on top of a previous career in the labormanagement arena, and has decided several hundred cases." Coleman & Coleman, supra note 160,
at 62-63.
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different consequences than when it is invoked between the parties to
the agreement in a suit to compel, or resist, arbitration. Consider, for
example, Warrior & Gulf, the case in which the presumption was announced. 6 2 The claim in that case was that the employer violated the
collective bargaining agreement by contracting out work.'63 There was
no provision in the agreement about contracting out work, but the union's grievance claimed that the employer action violated an implicit
restriction. The Supreme Court held that, since the claim was based on
the agreement, the issue as to whether the agreement in fact covered the
dispute was for the arbitrator, 65 even if, as in United Steelworkers of
America v. American Manufacturing Co.,166 the claim might appear to a
court to be frivolous. 67 It was then for the arbitrator to decide whether,
as a matter of interpretation of the agreement, the dispute was
"arbitrable" in the sense that the agreement implicitly limited the employer's right to contract out its work. 65
Where arbitrability is posed as a bar to an employee's suit claiming
a violation of a statute, there is no such second stage. Suppose, for example, that in Wright's case, the omission of the usual language limiting
the arbitrator to questions of interpretation and application in the
agreement was simply inadvertent, and that it could be proved that the
parties intended to make only questions of interpretation and application
of the agreement arbitrable. 69 If the union sought to compel arbitration

162. See United Steel 'Workers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583
(1960).
163. See id. at 575-76.
164. See id. at 584-85.
165. See id. at 585.
166. 363 U.S. 564 (1960). In American Manufacturing, an injured worker settled a workmen's compensation claim on the basis of a twenty-five percent permanent partial disability. See
American Manufacturing, 363 U.S. at 566. The employer rejected the employee's application for
reinstatement. See id. Regardless of the notion that the union's subsequent grievance was
"frivolous," as the Sixth Circuit opined, the Court ordered the grievance to be processed, for
"[w]hen the judiciary undertakes to determine the merits of a grievance... it usurps a function
which under [the grievance procedure of the collective bargaining agreement] is entrusted to the
arbitration tribunal." Id. at 566, 569.
167. In Warrior & Gulf, the Court stated that "[ilt is clear that under both the agreement in
this case and that involved in [American Manufacturing] ... [that] the question of arbitrability is
for the courts to decide." Warrior& Gulf, 363 U.S. at 583 n.7.
168. See id. at 584-85.
169. That in fact is not unlikely. The agreement on its face appears to be a pastiche assembled
from other agreements with some obvious omissions. The timeliness limitation, for example, says
that the union must appeal an adverse employer's decision within forty-eight hours of "such discussion." But there is no added antecedent for the "such." There is no provision for the discussion
of grievances or any description of what they may have concerned. The agreement explicitly pro-
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of a statutory claim, and the court relied on the presumption of arbitra-

bility to order arbitration, all of these matters could be brought forward
before the arbitrator in order to determine whether in fact he had the
authority to enforce the provisions of the ADA. However, where the
arbitrability of the statutory claim is set up as a bar to the individual
suit, there is no second stage. The trial court must resolve the question

of arbitrability finally and in litigation in which there is a reversal of the
usual roles.
In the usual case in which the presumption of arbitrability is invoked, the parties to the litigation are the employer and the union.7 0 In
most such cases, as in Warrior & Gulf, the union seeks to compel arbitration against the opposition of the employer.' In others, such as
Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery & Confectionery
Workers International,AFL-CIO' and Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining
Co.,'3 the employer seeks damages from the union for breach of the nostrike clause,'74 and the union argues that the claim must be arbitrated.'
But, where the claim of arbitrability is made to defeat the employee's
vides that the employer reserves the right to hire and to discharge, and contains no provision requiring the discharge to be for cause; discipline for listed offences is provided for by suspension
from the hiring hall. Yet the agreement in its arbitration provision requires the employer to make
financial restitution in cases of discharge.
170. See, e.g., Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 575 (involving petitioner-union and respondentemployer).
171. See id. at 577.
172. 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
173. 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
174. A no-strike clause is a common provision inserted into a collective bargaining agreement
whereby a union exchanges its promise not to strike in return for the employer's promise to agree
to a binding arbitration clause. See N.L.R.B. v. Tomco Communications, Inc., 567 F.2d 871, 879
(9th Cir. 1978). A no-strike clause is a mandatory subject of bargaining, and although grievance
arbitration clauses and no-strike clauses usually go hand-in-hand, there is no requirement that a
party insisting upon the inclusion of one of these clauses also acquiesce for insertion of the other.
See 48A AM. JUR. 2D. Labor & LaborRelations § 3043 (1994).
175. In Drake, the employer sued the union because it allegedly encouraged its members to
strike outright or to refrain from attending work, with either act being violative of the no-strike
clause contained in the collective bargaining agreement. See Drake, 370 U.S. at 256. The agreement provided for compulsory and binding arbitration of all complaints, disputes or grievances
involving questions of interpretation or application of any provision in the agreement. See id. at
257-58. The issue presented was "whether... the employer's claim was an arbitrable matter under
the contract." Id. at 255.
The employer's claim in Atkinson was essentially the same as the employer's claim in
Drake. In Atkinson, the agreement provided for compulsory arbitration of employee grievances
regarding wages, hours and working conditions. See Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 242-43. In return for the
arbitration clause, the union promised not to strike in response to disputes involving these matters.
See id. at 239. Again, the issue presented was whether the union's claim related to an arbitrable
matter. See id. at 240.
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suit, the employer being sued, rather than defending against a union
claim that the arbitration provision covers the dispute, is in the position
of arguing for a broad interpretation of the arbitration provision and the
union is simply absent. The employee is placed in the position of having
to argue that the arbitration provision must be narrowly construed, and
must do so in the absence of the union, and possibly contrary to its interests. It is here that the potential tension between the employee and the
union, the "furthermore" in Alexander, becomes relevant, not to deny
enforceability of the agreement to arbitrate, but to make inappropriate
the presumption of arbitrability.
These considerations argue for the proposition that where an arbitration provision in a collective agreement is urged as a bar to a suit by a
covered employee for violation of an anti-discrimination statute, the
Warrior & Gulf presumption should not be applicable. Indeed, the presumption should be its precise opposite. Statutory disputes should not
be found to be arbitrable under the agreement so as to bar an employee
suit unless it can be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
clause covers it. The principle can also be stated in the same terms as
those used by the Supreme Court in dealing with the similar question:
whether a court should read an agreement as giving an arbitrator the
authority to decide arbitrability. 176 In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan,7 7 the Court stated that "[c]ourts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is 'clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]' evidence that they did so. '' 17s Paraphrasing this statement, in
cases brought under an anti-discrimination statute, courts should not assume that parties to a collective bargaining agreement agreed to arbitrate individual public law claims not covered by the contract unless
there is clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so. In First Options, the Supreme Court said that courts should "hesitate to interpret
silence or ambiguity on the 'who should decide arbitrability' point as
giving the arbitrators that power, for doing so might too often force

176. See generally Natasha Wyss, Comment, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan: A
PerilousApproach to Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 72 TUL. L. REv. 351, 352-53 (1997) (examining the
question of whether arbitrators have the power in particular cases to rule on their own jurisdiction,
that is, if they have "competence of competence").
177. 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
178. First Options, 514 U.S. at 944. First Options involved disputes concerning a "workout
agreement" which governed the working out of debts owed by respondents to petitioner. See id. at
940. Respondents did not sign the workout document which contained the arbitration agreement.
See id. at 941. Thus, when petitioner submitted the claim to arbitration, respondents filed objections with the panel, denying that the disagreement was arbitrable. See id.
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unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would have
thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide."' 79 This is even more
true when the question of arbitrability of a statutory claim is raised as a
defense in an employee's suit because the consequence is not arbitration
at all, but, as in Wright's case, the death of the claim because the time
for filing a grievance has expired.
If the Supreme Court adopts the principle just set forth, it would
resolve Wright's case. There is no explicit incorporation of statutory
law in the agreement between union and the stevedoring companies.' 0
The arbitration provision is ambiguous. 8' It simply says that disputes
not resolved in undefined discussions between the parties should be decided by arbitration." In the absence of affirmative evidence that the
parties intended all disputes involving statutory claims to be arbitrable,
the motion to dismiss should have been denied.
IV. THE RIGHT ANSWER

The same principle would also resolve the cases in the other circuits alleged to be in conflict with Wright. In none of them was an arbitrator explicitly given the power not only to decide whether an antidiscrimination statute was violated but also the authority to provide the
remedies provided for in the statutes being sued upon.'83 In Varner v.
National Super Markets, Inc. 84 and Harrisonv. Eddy Potash,Inc.,'" the
claim of arbitrability was based upon a general arbitration provision not
explicitly providing that statutory claims could be arbitrated.'86 Pryner v.
Tractor Supply Co.'7 and Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Engineering

179. Id. at 945. For further analysis of the Court's reasoning in First Options, see generally
Kevin Michael Flowers, Comment, First Options of Chicago Inc. v. Kaplan, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON

Disp. REsOL. 801 (1997).
180. See Brief of the National Academy of Arbitrators as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1162 (1998) (No. 97-889), available

in 1998 WL 221374, at *13.
181. See id.
182. See Brief for Petitioner, Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1162
(1998) (No. 97-889), availablein 1998 WL 232769, at *6-*7.
183. See, e.g., Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 356 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that
the collective agreement did not even refer to federal or state law).
184. 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 946 (1997).
185. 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. granted and remanded on other grounds, 118 S.

Ct. 2364 (1998).
186. See Harrison,112 F.3d at 1451-52; Varner,94 F.3d at 1213.
187. 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 295 (1997).
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Corp.' s involved claims that an anti-discrimination provision in the
agreement required arbitration, but without any suggestion that the arbitrator was given authority to enforce the statutory provisions involved. 9
It is quite common for collective agreement anti-discrimination
provisions to make reference to the law.' 9 But that is far different from
providing that the arbitrator under the agreement has all of the powers,
remedial and procedural, that the law gives to the courts in antidiscrimination statutes. The Seventh Circuit was therefore correct in
Prynerin ignoring the fact that in one of the two cases, Sobierajski, the
anti-discrimination provision referred to the law, and in the other case,
Pryner, it did not. 9'
Only two of the circuit court cases present any problem - Austin
v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container,Inc.'92 in the Fourth Circuit and
Martin v. Dana Corp.'93 in the Third Circuit. In both of these cases there
was an agreement provision requiring that any claims of violation of an
anti-discrimination statute be subject to the grievance procedure. 4 But
in neither of these cases is there any indication that the arbitrator was
specifically given authority to decide the statutory question and the
authority to provide the statutory remedies.9 It is important, for the
purpose of applying the presumption I have argued for, to distinguish
between the grievance procedure and the arbitration provision. Many
collective agreements do, indeed, make all disputes eligible for processing in the grievance procedure.9 6 But they usually expressly limit arbitration to disputes involving the interpretation or application of the collective bargaining agreement."9 Because in neither of these cases was
188. 117 F.3d 519 (1lth Cir. 1997).
189. See Pryner, 109 F.3d at 356; Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 520-21.
190. Almost all collective bargaining agreements include anti-discrimination provisions, and
in many of these provisions management agrees not to discriminate against groups protected by
various federal, state and local anti-discrimination promulgations. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, INC., BASIC PATrERNS IN UNION CONTRACrS 130 (12th ed. 1989).
191. See Pryner, 109 F.3d at 356.
192. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996).
193. 75 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 871 (3d Cir. 1997). For all of the relevant citations to
Martin,see supranote 72.
194. See Martin, 75 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 872; Austin, 78 F.3d at 879-80.
195. See Martin, 75 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 872-73; Austin, 78 F.3d at 879-80.
196. See SuMNER H. SLICTER Er AL., THE IMPAcr OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON
MANAGEMENT 756 (1960). In United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960), the Supreme Court held that when the union and employer have agreed to arbitrate all disputes "as to the meaning, interpretation and application of the provisions" of a collective agreement, a court's only role is to ascertain "whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim
which on its face is governed by the contract." Id at 565, 567-68.
197. See SLICHTER, supranote 196, at 756.
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the courts' attention directed to the terms of the arbitration provision, it
is impossible to ascertain, without having access to the agreements,
whether the parties explicitly gave the arbitrator the power to adjudicate
statutory disputes and to provide statutory remedies. In the absence of
such explicit authority, the presumption would equally decide them.
A collective agreement may, of course, explicitly incorporate a
statute and explicitly provide for arbitration of a claim arising under a
statute. 9 ' An example is the contract provision proposed in 1975 by the
then General Counsel of the International Union of Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers ("TUEW"), expressly giving the arbitrator under a
collective bargaining agreement the authority to apply Title VII and
other anti-discrimination laws as well as the authority to award any
remedy which could be granted by a court, including such changes in
the agreement as necessary to comply with the statutes.'" Where there is
such a provision, there is no need for any presumption, and a court
would require arbitration of a statutory claim if the union demanded it.
The question of whether such a provision should bar direct access to the
courts by an individual employee depends on whether the Supreme
Court accepts the argument of the Petitioner and the Solicitor General in
Wright v. UniversalMaritime Service Corp.tu
The Petitioner in Wright, and the Solicitor General for the United
States and the EEOC argued for reversal on different grounds than the
20 1
presumption of non-arbitrability. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
and its progeny, they argued, controlled.' Although note is made of the
absence of any anti-discrimination provision in the collective agree198. "In these agreements, the parties agree that the arbitrator will apply 'external law' - the
same law a court would apply if it were resolving the dispute" rather than the arbitrator. Sarah Rudolph Cole, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the (Alternative) Forum:Reexamining Alexander v. Gardner-Denver in the Wake of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1997 BYU L.
REV. 591, 612 (1997). "Thus, it is no longer true that grievance arbitration is a forum solely for the
resolution of contractual claims." Id.; see also FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How
ARBITRATION WoRKS 545-51 (5th ed. 1997) (describing how arbitrators "act in respect to consideration or application of specific statutes").
199. See Winn Newman, Post-Gardner-DenverDevelopments in the Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, in ARB.-1975 (Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators) 57 (1976).
200. No. 96-2850, 1997 WL 422869 (4th Cir. July 29, 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1162
(1998). For all of the other relevant citations in the Wright case, see supra note 1.
201. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
202. See Brief for Petitioner, Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1162
(1998) (No. 97-889), available in 1998 WL 232769, at *12 [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief]; Brief
for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 118 S. Ct. 1162 (1998) (No. 97-889),
available in 1998 WL 232820, at *12 [hereinafter U.S. & EEOC Brief].
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ment, the brunt of Petitioner's argument is that under Alexander a collective agreement can never waive a covered employee's right to resort
to the courts.0 3 The Solicitor General is even more emphatic. He argues
that there is "an inherent conflict between the union's collective responsibilities and the employee's highly individual federal statutory
rights.""'
T'ain't necessarily so, particularly where the union has successfully negotiated a provision fully incorporating statutory rights. And not
so in this case. Wright's union has been assiduous in supporting his
ADA claim. Believing that his claim was not encompassed by the collective agreement, the local union president urged him to sue.Y5 When
the arbitration provision was held to bar his suit, the union has attempted, so far unsuccessfully, to arbitrate his ADA claim.2
Second, and more important, resolving tensions between represented employees is one of the most important functions a union performs. 7 John Dunlop has observed, collective bargaining requires the
union to resolve conflicting interests among the union's constituency."
For example, older workers' interests in pensions conflicts with younger
workers' interests in using part of an econonic settlement to extend
medical insurance protection to family members;' higher paid and
skilled workers prefer percentage increases in wages, while lower paid

203. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 202, at *12.
204. U.S. & EEOC Brief, supranote 202, at *18.
205. See Wright, 1997 WL 422869, at **1.
206. The sequence of events is as follows. Wright was originally refused work in January
1995. See id. at **1. Austin was decided by the Fourth Circuit on March 12, 1996. See Austin v.
Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996). On June 14, a magistrate
judge recommended that the suit be dismissed on Austin grounds. See Wright, 1998 WL 422869,
at **I. Then, in July 1996, the union again dispatched Wright from the hiring hall, and the companies again refused to hire him. This time the union filed a formal grievance for him based on the
second refusal. The employers refused to process the grievance on the ground that the filing was
an attempt to re-litigate the original refusal to hire Wright. Eventually, the union brought suit to
compel arbitration of the ADA claim, and the suit was dismissed as untimely. The union appealed,
and the appeal is currently pending before the Fourth Circuit. International Longshoremen's Ass'n
v. South Carolina Stevedores Ass'n, No. 98-1296 (4th Cir.).
207. "During collective bargaining, unions constantly balance conflicting interests among
employees." Dennis 0. Lynch, Incomplete Exclusivity and FairRepresentation: Inevitable Tensions in Florida'sPublic Sector Labor Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 573, 644 (1983). The union's
"balancing function is one of the major policy justifications for collective bargaining, and unions
play the same role in contract administration." Id.
208. See JOHNT. DUNLOp, THE MANAGEmENT OF LABOR UNIONS 101 (1990).
209. See DEREK C. BOK & JOHN T. DUNLoP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN CoMMUNrrY 92
(1970).
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and less skilled workers prefer across-the-board increases.2 '0 The union's function in collective bargaining is to achieve reconciliation between these interests in presenting its position in bargaining with the
employer.2 ' But that is not the case once agreement is reached. The union's function then is to enforce the agreed upon balance.22" There are
potential conflicts in many arbitration cases: 23 the conflict between the
employee who gets a promotion and the employee who the union contends was entitled to it; and the conflict between a discharged employee
whose grievance the union supports and the employee who has replaced
him. Unions must, and do, deal with these conflicts on a principled basis, subject to the duty of fair representation.1 4 It may certainly be true
that some unions may resolve against discriminatees the potential conflict among employees that is implicitly involved in enforcing statutory
protections against discrimination. But that is clearly not the case where
the union and the employer agree to incorporate the statutory protections in the collective agreement, authorize the arbitrator to go beyond
the usual remedies for violation of the agreement, and let the arbitrator
deploy the full panoply of statutory remedies.
Binding arbitration provides a real advantage in those situations
where the union and the employer, either by virtue of an agreement such
as that proposed by the then General Counsel of the IUEW or by stipulation in a particular case, have agreed to it.215 In addition to the usual
arbitration advantages of speed, flexibility and confidentiality, there is
the delicate and intricate relationship between the requirements of antidiscrimination statutes and the requirements of a collective bargaining
agreement. This relationship is particularly acute where there is a conflict between the reasonable accommodation requirement of the ADA2 6
210. See id. at 114.
211. See id. at 77-79.
212. See id. at 219-21.
213. See id. at 79-80.
214. The Supreme Court has defined the union's "duty of fair representation" owed to those it
represents as "a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to
avoid arbitrary conduct." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967). This duty extends to the union's processing of grievances. See id. at 185-86.
215. Benefits from using arbitration rather than litigation might include reduced costs and
quicker resolution of disputes. See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 198, at 10-13. Other potential
advantages include confidentiality, ability to select the decision maker and increased predictability, for the parties have knowledge of the arbitrator's past experiences, decisions and reputation.
See Michele L. Giovagnoli, Comment, To Be or Not to Be? Recent Resistance to MandatoryArbitrationAgreements in the Employment Arena, 64 UMKC L. REv. 547,582-83 (1996).
216. Under the ADA, no employer "shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
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and the seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.217 It is
2 5 and the ADEA." 9 Knowlalso true of the requirements of Title VW1
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). "Discrimination"
includes "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of
an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless [the
employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of [the employer's business]." Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (1998)
(announcing the same). The EEOC currently defines a "reasonable accommodation" as:
(i) Modifications or adjustments to a job application process that enable a qualified
applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such qualified applicant
desires; or (ii) Modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner
or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed,
that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of
that position; or (ii)
Modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are
enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities.
Id. § 1630.2(o)(1).
The guidelines continue, stating that a "reasonable accommodation" may include, but is not limited to:
(i) Making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities; and (ii) Job restructuring; part-time or modified work
schedules; reassignment to a vacant position; acquisition or modifications of equipment
or devices; appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials,
or policies; the provision of qualified readers or interpreters; and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
Id. § 1630.2(o)(2).
217. A "seniority provision" is a clause that might be inserted into a collective bargaining
agreement whereby seniority rights of the represented are safeguarded. See 5 THEODORE KHEEL,
LABOR LAW § 20.03[3][c], at 20-36 (1996). The seniority rights of an employee are a mandatory
subject of bargaining. See id. The primary purposes of the provision are to establish stability in the
workplace as well as stability within the union. See id. at 20-37. If an employer affords those with
seniority any special treatment, the employer cannot thereafter unilaterally abolish this special
treatment without granting the union an opportunity to bargain concerning these preferential
rights. See Bethlehem Steel Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1500, 1503 (1962).
The tension between a seniority provision and an ADA claim is illustrated in Eckles v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 94. F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996). In Eckles, a worker demanded that "reasonable
accommodations" be made for his handicap, but the only way that this could be done was if seniority rights of other employees were infringed upon. See id. at 1043. The court held that the Act
did not require as a "reasonable accommodation" that a disabled employee be given special treatment in violation of a bona fide seniority provision, when the special treatment would be the only
way of meeting job restrictions of the disabled employee. See id. at 1047-48.
218. Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
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edge about the realities of the relationships and practices in the workplace - the "common law of the shop" 0 if you will - is important for
the proper implementation of the statutory prohibitions and provision of
remedies that will in fact work. Arbitrators chosen by the parties are in a
far better position to accomplish that objective than are the courts where
the union and the employer authorize such action by their agreement:"'

The best solution from the viewpoint of an individual employee
would be to have an option: the right to choose as each dispute arises an
arbitration forum fully equivalent to the judicial one, or the judicial forum itself. But that ideal may be unachievable. There is no reason to
believe that unions and employers would agree to a fully-equivalent
arbitrable forum if each employee retains the option to ignore the forum
and if, following Alexander to the fullest, an individual employee who

loses in arbitration could then begin again in court.2
Finally, adoption of the rationale argued for by the Petitioner and
the Solicitor General in Wright might produce an anomaly. Although

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
Tension arises between the requirements of Title VII and seniority provisions because
"[d]iscrimination is often accomplished by invoking the neutral concepts of seniority." See 10
THEODORE KHEEL, LABOR LAW § 54.05[2], at 54-28 (1996). A defense to discrimination under the
Act is that the alleged discrimination was committed pursuant to the terms of bona fide seniority
system. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
219. Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's age; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's age; or (3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to
comply with [the Act].
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994).
Tension arises between the requirements of the ADEA and a seniority provision because
a defense under the Act is that the alleged discrimination was committed pursuant to "the terms of
a bona fide seniority system" which is not a subterfuge to avoid the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(A).
220. Professor Cox defined the "common law of the shop" as being made up of the "practices,
assumptions, understandings, and aspirations of the going industrial concern." Archibald Cox,
Reflections Upon LaborArbitration,72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1499, 1500 (1959).
221. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582
(1960) (noting that even the "ablest judge" cannot be expected to have a jointly-selected arbitrator's "experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because [the
judge] cannot be similarly informed"). Arbitrators may tailor their decisions to the peculiarities of
the workplace because they are generally unfettered by precedent, unlike a judge. See Tia Schneider Denenberg & R.V. Denenberg, The Future of the Workplace Dispute Resolver, 49 DISP.
RESOL. J. 48, 52 (1994).
222. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974) (instructing the federal
district court to consider the employee's statutory claim de novo).
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much criticized,'

the prevailing view is that under Gilmer v. Inter-

state/JohnsonLane Corp.,' employees can be required as a condition
of employment to agree to arbitrate their statutory claims, and that such

an agreement bars direct access to the courts.

Adoption of the Alexan-

der position proposed by the Petitioner would mean that a union and an
employer could not agree to a result that an employer could impose

unilaterally in the absence of a union.
For these reasons it seems to me that a good argument can be made

that where a collective agreement incorporates statutory protections
against discrimination and provides for a fully equivalent arbitrable
remedy, the rule of Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox2 should apply and
require an individual employee to utilize arbitration and to be bound by
the result,27 subject, as in any other case, to claims based on a union's
failure to fairly represent,' and also subject to whatever standard of
review is developed for statutory arbitration. The standard for review of
an arbitrator's decision in a non-union situation is presently uncertain. 229
But that standard, whatever it may ultimately turn out to be, should apply whether the arbitration is pursuant to a unilaterally imposed requirement or by virtue of a collective bargaining agreement.
As I have said, this is an entirely hypothetical question. None of
the cases so far reported have dealt with a collective agreement which
would overcome the presumption of non-arbitrability of statutory

claims. Discussion of the hypothetical case is important, however, because a decision in Wright based on Alexander would in effect predetermine the result in such a hypothetical case. A decision by the Su223. See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory DiscriminationClaims:Rights "Waived" and Lost
in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. LJ.381, 383 (1996) (arguing that the decision in
Gilmer "carries alternative dispute resolution to excess"); Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment DiscriminationClaims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB.
L.J. 1, 16, 52 (1996) (arguing that Gilmer was really a "narrow opinion" with "particular facts").
224. 500U.S. 20 (1991).
225. See Cole, supranote 194, at 595 (referring to an agreement requiring "an employee, as a
condition of employment, to sign a predispute arbitration agreement foregoing all access to jury
trials" as a "Gilmer" agreement); see also Carol-Teigue J. Thomas, Comment, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation: When is an Employee's Right to a JudicialForum Precludedby
an Arbitration Agreement?, 27 NEv ENG. L. REv. 791, 822-23 (1993) (concluding that "at the
present time it is certain that for the employee who challenges a boilerplate clause precluding his
or her right to a judicial forum, the outlook is grim").
226. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
227. See Maddox, 379 U.S. at 652.
228. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 185-88 (1967).
229. See generally Robert N. Covington, Employment ArbitrationAfter Gilmer: Have Labor
Courts Come to the United States?, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L.J. 345, 382, 410 (1998)
(exploring the issue of the applicable standard in this situation).
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preme Court on the basis of the presumption described in this Article,
pretermitting the Alexander question, would resolve in a simple and direct fashion all of the cases reported so far in which arbitration under a
collective bargaining agreement has been set up as a bar to a direct suit
by an employee claiming violation of an anti-discrimination statute,
leaving open for later consideration the question of what the result
should be where a collective agreement explicitly incorporates statutory
protection against discrimination and authorizes arbitrators to provide
the full complement of remedies.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has granted review in a case in which it is tolerably clear that the decision below will be reversed. There appears to
be little reason to grant to affirm an unreported opinion. The only real
issue is the ground for reversal. It may be, although no party or amicus
has argued the question, that the Court has second thoughts about Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.20 and will use Wright v. Universal
Maritime Service Corp.2' to modify or overrule it. More likely, the
Court will accept the argument of the petitioner and the Solicitor General based on Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.212 that a collective
agreement can never serve to bar an individual employee's right to
bring suit directly on a claim of violation of an anti-discrimination statute.23 For the reasons given, it would be far better to base the decision
on the proposition that a collective agreement should not be assumed to
require arbitration of statutory claims unless it expressly so provides
and gives the arbitrator the authority to provide the full panoply of
statutory remedies.

230. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
231. No. 96-2850, 1997 WL 422869 (4th Cir. July 29, 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1162
(1998). For all of the relevant citations accompanying Wright, see supra note 1.
232. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
233. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60.
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